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FOREWORD
WHAT'S THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR?
Jose E. Alvarez*
The Security Council has long served as international law's Ror-
schach test. Operating at the crossroads of international law and interna-
tional relations, the post-Cold War Security Council embodies both
politics and norm-making capabilities. What scholars see when they
examine the inkblot which is today's Council says a great deal about
contemporary schools of thought. What scholars say the Council is for,
also says quite a bit about what they think international lawyering (and
international law) is all about. In the process, Council analysts reveal
themselves as political "realists," legal "utopians," nationalists, cosmo-
politans, institutionalists, humanists, environmentalists, socialists,
Europhiles, "Third World" sympathizers, feminists ... and the list goes
on. Council scholarship is often (inadvertently) personal, though usually
cast as universal.
Students of the literature on the Security Council will recognize in
these articles and essays, selected by the Journal's editors for this sym-
posium issue, many representative strands in that ever-burgeoning
literature. Although the Journal's editors accepted these articles and
essays on an individual basis and no author was afforded the opportuni-
ty to read or react to others' contributions, the results are a fascinating
counterpoint of views nonetheless. At times, it seems as if the contribu-
tors are reacting to each other's work.
Malvina Halberstam, John Quigley and Judith G. Gardam each
choose to examine traditional legal problems at the heart of "public"
international law posed by today's Council. They answer these with the
legal tools long respected in the trade, primarily arguments grounded in
treaty text and "intent" (of either the "original" or more teleological
variety). Halberstam addresses a problem which arose most prominently
on the eve of the Council's authorization to use force in the Gulf War:
the legality of unilateral self-defense, pending Council action.
Halberstam concludes "that the Charter was not intended to and should
not be interpreted to deny a state the right of self-defense, even if the
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Security Council has taken measures to deal with the problem."'
Quigley addresses the legality of the Gulf War itself, as well as subse-
quent Council authorizations of military force. He argues that by con-
tracting out the use of force to members of the organization (a process
Quigley calls "privatization"), the Council "has relinquished its Charter
defined role," and has acted contrary to the express wording and intent
of the Charter, with potentially adverse consequences.2 Gardam, while
also concerned with the Council's resort to force, addresses other legal
restraints on the Council, namely, limits on the use of force derived
from humanitarian and general international law. She concludes that the
Council, even if it was authorized to "delegate" the use of force to
member states as it has repeatedly done, is limited by the general princi-
ples of proportionality and necessity that constrain the use of force by
states.' She further concludes that the Council is also "under a legal
obligation to ensure that forces acting under its auspices comply with
the appropriate customary rules of humanitarian law."4
Although all three focus on military action, that is the extent of the
similarities between Halberstam's, Quigley's, and Gardam's respective
contributions. Each of these authors has a radically different perspective
on what the Security Council is all about.
The Security Council (along with the U.N. Charter), for Halberstam,
seems to be but a mechanism to ensure the sanctity of states and their
existing borders; the Council exists to buttress state sovereignty, not to
undermine it. Under this state-centric view, what states might be said to
have "consented" to in 1945 - cast as "original intent" - is conclu-
sive. For Halberstam, fears of what states might do with their self-
judging license to act in "self-defense" or what effects this might have
on United Nations Purposes and Principles, including human rights and
the ban on inter-state force in Article 2(4) of the Charter are secondary;
Halberstam argues that whatever the cost, the U.N. Charter cannot be
read as a suicide pact for existing states.
Although Quigley does not deal directly with the question that
Halberstam chooses to address, his stance is antithetical to Halberstam's.
For him, the Council, far from being the handmaiden of states, is a
1. Malvina Halberstam, The Right to Self-Defense Once the Security Council Takes
Action, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 229, 231 (1996).
2. John Quigley, The "Privatization" of Security Council Enforcement Action: A Threat
to Multilateralism, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 249, 250, passim (1996).
3. Judith G. Gardam, Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action,
17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 285, 307-12 (1996).
4. Id. at 321.
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multilateral counterpoint to them; the Council is intended to ensure that
"collective force will be used only in pursuit of commonly held objec-
tives of the international community.' '5 It is precisely because Quigley
fears that individual states, even when licensed by the Council, may act
for motivations inconsistent with the community goals outlined in the
United Nations' Purposes and Principles that Quigley opposes delegating
the use of force to states. He favors instead truly multilateral action
deployed, directed, ,and commanded by the United Nations itself and not
by Council-authorized permanent members.
Gardam also grounds her perspective on the broad Purposes and
Principles stated in Articles 1 and 2 of the U.N. Charter. Like Quigley,
she implicitly assumes that the Security Council exists to further com-
munity goals and that these goals are not always consistent with the
protection of states qua states. But whereas Quigley tends to equate
community goals with multilateral action by the organization, Gardam
focuses her attention on the impact of Council action on the ground. She
wants to ensure that under the law, combatants, civilians, and non-
combatants will be as protected during the United Nations' use of force
as they would be during a war between states. For Gardam, the Council
ultimately exists to respect existing rules of law, including those on the
use of force and the conduct of war.
Fernando R. Tes6n goes much further than Gardam. He assumes
that the Council is limited by Gardam's humanitarian principles but
what he seeks to establish is the Council's normative impact on general
international law, and specifically on the doctrine of "collective humani-
tarian intervention." Tes6n is not satisfied with existing international
norms - not if they stop at the borders of a state and can be read to
prohibit collective intervention to remedy gross human rights abuses
within those borders. For Tes6n, recent Council actions - intended to
protect the Kurds in Iraq, ensure humanitarian assistance to starving
Somalis, return a democratically elected government to power in Haiti,
and prevent further gross violations of human rights in Rwanda and
Bosnia - constitute significant legal precedents to the contrary. Re-
gardless of what the Council says it is doing, or the caution with which
it establishes the "uniqueness" of its actions, for Tes6n the Council is
helping to shrink dramatically the concept of exclusive "domestic juris-
diction" immune from international scrutiny. For Tes6n, the Council
exists for one purpose, the one "morally defensible foundation of inter-
national law" - respect for democracy and human rights which together
5. Quigley, supra note at 2.
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are "essential for the preservation of peace in the new international
order.",6 Tes6n sees this moral imperative as a license that permits the
Council to change the law as necessary. Unlike Halberstam, Tes6n is not
interested in the Council as status quo protector of state boundaries and
his teleological perspective on the scope of the Council's powers is at
odds with Halberstam's, Quigley's, and even Gardam's more cautious,
restrictive approach to Charter interpretation.
Anne Orford is also interested in the Council's impact on human
beings and their rights but her conclusions are dramatically opposed to
those of Tes6n, et al. Orford directs her attention to the gender-differen-
tiated effects of Council actions. She argues that Council actions have
made women less secure in Kuwait, Iraq, Cambodia, Somalia, Mozam-
bique, Bosnia, and even (through the encouragement given to
militarization) the United States. Further, she argues that the assump-
tions which underlie the United Nations collective security system, far
from reflecting "community" or universal goals (as Quigley and Tes6n,
for example, suggest), in fact privilege the position of elite men and
ignore the legitimate desires of the majority of humankind, especially
women. Orford challenges Tes6n's belief that the Council has a mandate
to promote Western-style democracy and that it may intervene at will,
even by force, in Third World states. Orford's view is also totally at
odds with Halberstam's defense of the statist status quo; Orford finds
international law's reliance on state sovereignty to be a bankrupt notion
since states have long failed to protect women's security. For Orford,
the Security Council should, ideally, present a forum for rethinking
fundamental concepts of "sovereignty, political identity, and security in
ways that draw on feminist attempts to value difference while redefining
community."7 Orford has no faith that these goals will be achieved
either *by Quigley's or Tes6n's versions of multilateralism, or by
Gardam's reliance on established rules of law.
David P. Fidler's article might help to explain why the differing
perspectives of scholars like Halberstam, Quigley, Gardam, and Orford,
remain possible fifty years after the creation of the Council. Fidler
explains contradictory contemporary visions for the Council in terms of
competing perspectives within the "liberal" tradition, namely, "liberal
internationalism" (focusing on the prospects for cooperation through
international organizations), "liberal realism" (emphasizing the need for
6. Fernando R. Tes6n, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 323,
371 (1996).
7. Anne Orford, The Politics of Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L, 373, 405
(1996).
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a balance of power among democratic states), and "liberal globalism"
(concentrating on the like-mindedness of individuals, especially econom-
ic interdependence). As Fidler sees it, each of these liberal perspectives
has a different vision of what the Council is for: to actively promote
peace, as a figleaf for hegemonic power, or as an indirect agent of
economic interdependence. Fidler contends that while all three perspec-
tives share some common assumptions, liberals' failure to reach consen-
sus about the purpose. and potential for the Security Council complicates
the potential for a viable United Nations reform agenda. It remains to be
seen where along his spectrum of "liberalism" Fidler would place
Halberstam, Quigley, Gardam, Tes6n, and Orford.
Martti Koskenniemi similarly takes a step back, to examine the role
of law and lawyers in the Council's work. Here, as elsewhere, 8
Koskenniemi's concern is with the Council's legitimacy. In this issue,
Koskenniemi responds to realist critics of the Council who have argued
that it does not and can not apply rules and that politicized selectivity is
unavoidable. Koskenniemi tackles realist assumptions - especially the
assumed primacy of balance of power and military concerns and the
supposition that monolithic "state" interests exist - and argues, largely
based on the author's own experiences as a legal advisor to a member
of the Council, that normative rules of international law are constitutive
and not merely post-hoc rationalizations for what the Council does. He
suggests that in the day-to-day practice of the Council, law and politics
develop in tandem as action, turned into "precedent," invokes demands
for consistency. He argues that those engaged in the Council's work,
even in a period of crisis such as the Gulf War, are situated in and
committed to a "legal culture." Moreover, Koskenniemi argues that this
is a desirable outcome in that such "situatedness" permits an open
dialogue with other members of the same community and helps to
define the organization's identity. Koskenniemi concludes with recom-
mendations intended to strengthen the Council's legal culture, involving
reforms to promote greater transparency, procedural safeguards, and
enhanced accountability. For Koskenniemi, the Council exists, at least in
part, as a forum for a working legal culture that helps to "civilize"
discussions of security.
Elements of Koskenniemi's rich and interesting perspective are
taken up in the prescriptions for reform made by essayists Richard Falk,
Linda A. Malone and A. Peter Mutharika. Like Koskenniemi, Falk is
concerned with the "admixtures of politics, morality, and law" evident
8. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN."
A Dialectical View, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 325 (1995).
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in the Council's decisions to intervene in the affairs of states. Falk
surveys the historical development of each of these three dimensions
and identifies how, in conjunction, political, moral, and legal consider-
ations set the stage for Council decisions. Like Tes6n, Falk reads recent
Council actions as part of "welcome" trends in favor of humanitarian
intervention to alleviate human suffering and he concludes with specific
recommendations (some reminiscent of those made by Koskenniemi) to
further this development. .
Malone takes reform in a different direction. She relies on recent
precedents by the Council to identify the environmental components of
international peace and security and argues that Article 2(7)'s "domestic
jurisdiction" no longer prevents enforcement action directed at environ-
mental disasters. She proposes a reform agenda intended to secure
Council involvement in "environmental management."
For his part, Mutharika draws lessons for the handling of conflicts
in Africa from the "integrated global peace management strategy"
evinced in the Bosnian peace settlement. After identifying sources of
conflict in Africa and synthesizing the successes and failures of United
Nations peace management strategies in five African conflicts,
Mutharika advocates structural and other reforms that in his view would
best enable the Council to handle future African conflicts.
Each of the articles and essays in this volume share connections
with particular sub-bodies of scholarship within the literature relating to
the Security Council. Halberstam's, Quigley's, and Gardam's specific
inquiries have been the subject of prior scholarly analyses.9 Tes6n shares
concerns evident in a vast literature on the scope of humanitarian inter-
vention ° and like much recent scholarship that is both critical and
laudatory of the Council, his work assumes that the Council regularly
produces legally relevant precedents." Moreover, Tes6n's moralistic
9. With respect to Halberstam, see Halberstam, supra note 1, at 230 n.8; with respect to
Quigley, some of the literature is surveyed in Gardam, supra note 2, at 287 n.8; with respect
to Gardam, see, e.g., Richard D. Glick, Lip Service to the Laws of War: Humanitarian Law
and United Nations Armed Forces, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 53 (1995).
10. See, e.g., Jarat Chopra & Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct:
Codifying Humanitarian Intervention, 6 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 95 (1992); Juan Antonio Carrillo
Salcedo, Le rble du Conseil de SLcuriti dans l'organisation et la riglementation du "droit
d'assistance humanitaire, in PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 157 (Rend-Jean Dupuy ed., 1993); David J. Scheffer,
Toward A Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253 (1992).
11. For an early view of the normative impact of the Council, see Oscar Schachter, The
Quasi-Judicial Rble of the Security Council and the General Assembly, 58 AM. J. INT'L L.
960 (1964); for a more recent view, see, Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforce-
ment Action and Issues of State Responsibility, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 55 (1994). For a more
critical view of Council "precedents," see, e.g., Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in
Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519 (1994).
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stance revives a natural law strain within international law scholarship. 12
Orford's work is an offshoot of a new wave of feminist critiques of
international law, peace, and security issues, and the United Nations.' 3 It
also shares connections with an emerging body of "new stream" or
"critical" legal studies of international law. 14 Koskenniemi, one of the
prominent authors within this "critical stream," in this issue shares con-
cerns with more traditional "legitimation" scholars. 5 His work, along
with Fidler's and Falk's, also reflects an effort to "build bridges" be-
tween legal and international relations scholars.16 Their efforts contribute
to a debate currently raging within political science circles, namely,
whether institutions like the Council matter? 7
Finally, the prescriptions for change proposed by Koskenniemi,
Falk, Malone, and Mutharika are modern-day versions of a reformist
literature of considerable pedigree. Indeed, the United Nations itself was
inspired by notable blueprints for institutionalist designs to handle peace
and security.'8 These latest guideposts for reform suggest that despite the
pessimism and post-Somalia/Bosnia malaise which has settled upon the
12. See also Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 53 (1992).
13. See, e.g., Orford, supra note 7, at 374 n.3, 376 n.5, 408 n.153; Hilary Charlesworth,
Transforming the United Men's Club: Feminist Futures for the United Nations, 4
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 421 (1994).
14. See, e.g., DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987); MARTTI
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT (1989); David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 1 (1988); Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 81 (1991).
15. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
(1990); David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council,
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (1993). See also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA H. CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY (1995) (examining the determinants of compliance).
16. See, e.g., International Law and International Relations Theory: Building Bridges, 86
PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 167 (1992).
17. See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19
INT'L SEC. 5 (Winter 1994-95). Responses to Mearsheimer are contained in a symposium,
Promises, Promises: Can Institutions Deliver?, 20 INT'L SEC. 39, 39-81 (Summer 1995)
(responses by Robert 0. Keohane, Lisa L. Martin, Charles A. Kupchan, Clifford A. Kupchan,
John Gerard Ruggie, and Alexander Wendt).
18. For an overview of the reformist literature as related to the creation of the United
Nations' predecessor, the League of Nations, see David Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 8
CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (1987). For an early attempt at United Nations reform, see GRENVILLE
CLARK & LOUIS B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW (1958). For more recent
efforts, see, e.g., Saul H. Mendlovitz & Burns H. Weston, From Geopolitics to Humane
Governance: Transition Steps, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 669 (1994). For a
useful overview, see, e.g., Maurice Bertrand, The Historical Development of Efforts to Reform
the UN, in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD 420 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury
eds., 2d ed. 1993).
Winter 19961
228 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 17:221
Council, compounded by the United Nations' profound financial trou-
bles, hope for the Council's prospects to handle the world's problems
springs eternal.
